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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of distributed detection in tree topologies in the presence
of Byzantines. The expression for minimum attacking power required by the Byzantines to blind the
fusion center (FC) is obtained. More specifically, we show that when more than a certain fraction of
individual node decisions are falsified, the decision fusion scheme becomes completely incapable. We
obtain closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies that minimize the detection error
exponent at the FC. We also look at the possible counter-measures from the FC’s perspective to protect
the network from these Byzantines. We formulate the robust topology design problem as a bi-level
program and provide an efficient algorithm to solve it. We also provide some numerical results to gain
insights into the solution.
Index Terms
Distributed Detection, Byzantine Attacks, Kullback-Leibler Divergence, Bounded Knapsack Prob-
lem, Bi-level Programming
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed detection has been a well studied topic in the detection theory literature [1] [2]
[3] and has traditionally focused on the parallel network topology. In distributed detection with
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2parallel topology, nodes make their local decisions regarding the underlying phenomenon and
send them to the fusion center (FC), where a global decision is made. Even though the parallel
topology has received significant attention, there are many practical situations where parallel
topology cannot be implemented due to several factors, such as, the FC being outside the
communication range of the nodes and limited energy budget of the nodes [4]. In such cases,
a multi-hop network is employed, where nodes are organized hierarchically into multiple levels
(tree networks). With intelligent use of resources across levels, tree networks have the potential
to provide a suitable balance between cost, coverage, functionality, and reliability [5]. Some
examples of tree networks include wireless sensor and military communication networks. For
instance, the IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee) specifications [6] and IEEE 802.22b [7] can support tree-
based topologies. Theses nodes are often deployed in open and unattended environments and
are vulnerable to physical tampering.
In recent years, security issues of distributed inference networks are increasingly being studied.
One typical attack on such networks is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine attacks (originally
proposed by [8]) may, in general, refer to many types of malicious behavior; our focus in this
paper is on data-falsification attacks [9]–[17]. In this type of attack, the compromised node
may send false (erroneous) local decisions to the FC to degrade the detection performance. This
attack becomes more severe in tree topologies where malicious nodes can alter local decisions
of a large part of the network and cause degradation of system performance and may even make
the decision fusion schemes to become completely incapable. In this paper, we refer to such a
data falsification attacker as a Byzantine.
A. Related Work
Although distributed detection has been a very active field of research in the past [1]–[3],
security problems in distributed detection networks gained attention only very recently. In [12],
the authors considered the problem of distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines for a
parallel topology and determined the optimal attacking strategy which minimizes the detection
error exponent. They assumed that the Byzantines know the true hypothesis, which obviously
is not satisfied in practice but does provide a bound. In [13], the authors analyzed the same
problem in the context of collaborative spectrum sensing. They relaxed the assumption of perfect
knowledge of the hypotheses by assuming that the Byzantines obtain knowledge about the true
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3hypotheses from their own sensing observations.
The above work [12], [13] addresses the issue of Byzantines from the attacker’s perspective.
Schemes to mitigate the effect of Byzantines have also been proposed in the literature. In [13],
the authors proposed a simple scheme to identify the Byzantines. The idea was to maintain a
reputation metric for every node by comparing each node’s local decision to the global decision
made at the FC using the majority rule. In [16], the authors proposed another scheme to mitigate
the effect of Byzantines in a parallel topology. The idea behind the proposed identification scheme
is to compare every node’s observed behavior over time with the expected behavior of an honest
node. The nodes whose observed behavior is sufficiently far from the expected behavior are
tagged as Byzantines and this information is employed while making a decision at the FC. In
[17], the authors investigated the problem of distributed detection in the presence of different
types of Byzantine nodes. Each Byzantine type corresponds to a different operating point and,
therefore, the problem of identifying different Byzantine nodes along with their operating points
was considered. Once the Byzantine operating points are estimated, this information was utilized
by the FC to improve global detection performance. The problem of designing the optimal fusion
rule and the local sensor thresholds with Byzantines for a parallel topology was considered
in [15].
B. Main Contributions
All the approaches discussed so far consider distributed detection with Byzantines for parallel
topologies. In contrast to previous work, we study the problem of distributed detection with
Byzantines for tree topologies. More specifically, we address the problem of distributed detection
in perfect a-ary tree networks1 in the presence of Byzantine attacks (data falsification attcks). We
assume that the cost of attacking nodes at different levels is different and analyze the problem
under this assumption. In our preliminary work on this problem [14], we analyzed the problem
only from an attacker’s perspective assuming that the honest and Byzantine nodes are identical in
terms of their detection performance. In our current work, we significantly extend our previous
work and investigate the problem from both the attacker’s and the FC’s perspective. For the
analysis of the optimal attack, we allow Byzantines to have different detection performance
1For previous works on perfect a-ary tree networks, please see [18], [19], [20].
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Fig. 1. A distributed detection system organized as a perfect binary tree T (3, 2) is shown as an example.
than the honest nodes and, therefore, provide a more general and comprehensive analysis of
the problem compared to our previous work [14]. The main contributions of this paper are as
follows.
• We obtain a closed form expression for the minimum attacking power required by the
Byzantines to blind the FC in a tree network and show that when more than a certain
fraction of individual node decisions are falsified, the decision fusion scheme becomes
completely incapable.
• When the fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind the FC, we provide closed form
expressions for the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that most degrade the
detection performance.
• We also look at the problem from the network designer’s (FC) perspective. More specifically,
we formulate the robust tree topology design problem as a bi-level program and provide an
efficient algorithm to solve it, which is guaranteed to find an optimal solution, if one exists.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our system model.
In Section III, we study the problem from Byzantine’s perspective and provide closed form
expressions for optimal attacking strategies. In Section IV, we formulate the robust topology
design problem as a bi-level program and provide an efficient algorithm to solve it in polynomial
time. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
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5II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a distributed detection system with the topology of a perfect a-tree T (K, a)
rooted at the FC (See Fig. 1). A perfect a-tree is an a-ary tree in which all the leaf nodes are
at the same depth and all the internal nodes have degree ‘a’. T (K, a) has a set N = {Nk}Kk=1
of transceiver nodes, where |Nk| = Nk = ak is the total number of nodes at level (or depth) k.
We assume that the depth of the tree is K > 1 and the number of children is a ≥ 2. The total
number of nodes in the network is denoted as
∑K
k=1Nk = N . B = {Bk}
K
k=1 denotes the set of
Byzantine nodes with |Bk| = Bk, where Bk is the set of Byzantines at level k. We assume that
the FC is not aware of the exact set of Byzantine nodes and considers each node at level k to
be Byzantine with a certain probability αk. In practice, nodes operate with very limited energy
and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the packet IDs (or source IDs) are not forwarded
in the tree to save energy. Moreover, even in cases where the packet IDs (or source IDs) are
forwarded, notice that the packet IDs (or source IDs) can be tempered too, thereby preventing
the FC to be deterministically aware of the source of a message. Therefore, we consider that the
FC looks at messages coming from nodes in a probabilistic manner and considers each received
bit to originate from nodes at level k with certain probability βk ∈ [0, 1]. This also implies that,
from the FC’s perspective, received bits are identically distributed. For a T (K, a),
βk =
ak
N
.
A. Distributed detection in a tree topology
We consider a binary hypothesis testing problem with the two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent)
and H1 (signal is present). Each node i at level k acts as a source in that it makes a one-bit local
decision vk,i ∈ {0, 1} and sends uk,i to its parent node at level k− 1, where uk,i = vk,i if i is an
uncompromised (honest) node, but for a compromised (Byzantine) node i, uk,i need not be equal
to vk,i. It also receives the decisions uk′,j of all successors j at levels k′ ∈ [k + 1, K], which
are forwarded to i by its immediate children. It forwards2 these received decisions along with
uk,i to its parent node at level k− 1. If node i is a Byzantine, then it might alter these received
decisions before forwarding. We assume error-free communication channels between children
2For example, IEEE 802.16j mandates tree forwarding and IEEE 802.11s standardizes a tree-based routing protocol.
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6and the parent nodes. We denote the probabilities of detection and false alarm of a honest node
i at level k by PHd = P (vk,i = 1|H1, i /∈ Bk) and PHfa = P (vk,i = 1|H0, i /∈ Bk), respectively.
Similarly, the probabilities of detection and false alarm of a Byzantine node i at level k are
denoted by PBd = P (vk,i = 1|H1, i ∈ Bk) and PBfa = P (vk,i = 1|H0, i ∈ Bk), respectively.
B. Byzantine attack model
Now a mathematical model for the Byzantine attack is presented. If a node is honest, then it
forwards its own decision and received decisions without altering them. However, a Byzantine
node, in order to undermine the network performance, may alter its decision as well as received
decisions from its children prior to transmission. We define the following strategies PHj,1, PHj,0
and PBj,1, PBj,0 (j ∈ {0, 1}) for the honest and Byzantine nodes, respectively:
Honest nodes:
PH1,1 = 1− P
H
0,1 = P
H(x = 1|y = 1) = 1 (1)
PH1,0 = 1− P
H
0,0 = P
H(x = 1|y = 0) = 0 (2)
Byzantine nodes:
PB1,1 = 1− P
B
0,1 = P
B(x = 1|y = 1) (3)
PB1,0 = 1− P
B
0,0 = P
B(x = 1|y = 0) (4)
where P (x = a|y = b) is the probability that a node sends a to its parent when it receives b
from its child or its actual decision is b. Furthermore, we assume that if a node (at any level)
is a Byzantine then none of its ancestors are Byzantines; otherwise, the effect of a Byzantine
due to other Byzantines on the same path may be nullified (e.g., Byzantine ancestor re-flipping
the already flipped decisions of its successor). This means that any path from a leaf node to the
FC will have at most one Byzantine. Thus, we have,
∑K
k=1 αk ≤ 1 since the average number of
Byzantines along any path from a leaf to the root cannot be greater than 1.
C. Performance metric
The Byzantine attacker always wants to degrade the detection performance at the FC as much
as possible; in contrast, the FC wants to maximize the detection performance. In this work,
we employ the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) [21] to be the network performance metric
DRAFT
7P (zi = j|H0) =
[
K∑
k=1
βk
(
k∑
i=1
αi
)]
[PBj,0(1− P
B
fa) + P
B
j,1P
B
fa]
+
[
K∑
k=1
βk
(
1−
k∑
i=1
αi
)]
[PHj,0(1− P
H
fa) + P
H
j,1P
H
fa] (7)
P (zi = j|H1) =
[
K∑
k=1
βk
(
k∑
i=1
αi
)]
[PBj,0(1− P
B
d ) + P
B
j,1P
B
d ]
+
[
K∑
k=1
βk
(
1−
k∑
i=1
αi
)]
[PHj,0(1− P
H
d ) + P
H
j,1P
H
d ] (8)
that characterizes detection performance. The KLD is a frequently used information-theoretic
distance measure to characterize detection performance. By Stein’s lemma, we know that in the
Neyman-Pearson setup for a fixed missed detection probability, the false alarm probability obeys
the asymptotics
lim
N→∞
lnPF
N
= −D, for a fixed PM , (5)
where PM , PF are missed detection and false alarm probabilities, respectively. The KLD between
the distributions πj,0 = P (z = j|H0) and πj,1 = P (z = j|H1) can be expressed as
D(πj,1||πj,0) =
∑
j∈{0,1}
P (z = j|H1) log
P (z = j|H1)
P (z = j|H0)
. (6)
For a K-level network, distributions of received decisions at the FC zi, i = 1, .., N , under H0
and H1 are given by (7) and (8), respectively. In order to make the analysis tractable, we assume
that the network designer attempts to maximize the KLD of each node as seen by the FC. On
the other hand, the attacker attempts to minimize the KLD of each node as seen by the FC.
Next, we explore the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that most degrade the
detection performance by minimizing KLD.
III. OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACK
As discussed earlier, the Byzantine nodes attempt to make their KL divergence as small as
possible. Since the KLD is always non-negative, Byzantines attempt to choose P (z = j|H0) and
DRAFT
8P (z = j|H1) such that KLD is zero. In this case, an adversary can make the data that the FC
receives from the nodes such that no information is conveyed. This is possible when
P (z = j|H0) = P (z = j|H1) ∀j ∈ {0, 1}. (9)
Substituting (7) and (8) in (9) and after simplification, the condition to make the KLD = 0 for
a K-level network can be expressed as
PBj,1 − P
B
j,0 =
∑K
k=1[βk(1−
∑k
i=1 αi)]∑K
k=1[βk(
∑k
i=1 αi)]]
PHd − P
H
fa
PBd − P
B
fa
(PHj,0 − P
H
j,1). (10)
From (1) to (4), we have
PB0,1 − P
B
0,0 =
∑K
k=1[βk(1−
∑k
i=1 αi)]∑K
k=1[βk(
∑k
i=1 αi)]]
PHd − P
H
fa
PBd − P
B
fa
= −(PB1,1 − P
B
1,0). (11)
Hence, the attacker can degrade detection performance by intelligently choosing (PB0,1, PB1,0),
which are dependent on αk, for k = 1, · · · , K. Observe that,
0 ≤ PB0,1 − P
B
0,0
since
∑k
i=1 αi ≤ 1 for k ≤ K. To make KLD = 0, we must have
PB0,1 − P
B
0,0 ≤ 1
such that (PBj,1, PBj,0) becomes a valid probability mass function. Notice that, when PB0,1−PB0,0 > 1
there does not exist any attacking probability distribution (PBj,1, PBj,0) that can make KLD = 0.
In the case of PB0,1 − PB0,0 = 1, there exists a unique solution (PB1,1, PB1,0) = (0, 1) that can make
KLD = 0. For the PB0,1 − PB0,0 < 1 case, there exist an infinite number of attacking probability
distributions (PBj,1, PBj,0) which can make KLD = 0.
By further assuming that the honest and Byzantine nodes are identical in terms of their
detection performance, i.e., PHd = PBd and PHfa = PBfa, the above condition to blind the FC
reduces to ∑K
k=1[βk(1−
∑k
i=1 αi)]∑K
k=1[βk(
∑k
i=1 αi)]]
≤ 1
which is equivalent to
K∑
k=1
[βk(1− 2(
k∑
i=1
αi))] ≤ 0. (12)
Recall that αk = BkNk and βk =
Nk∑K
i=1 Ni
. Substituting αk and βk into (12) and simplifying the
result, we have the following theorem.
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9Theorem 1. In a tree network with K levels, there exists an attacking probability distribution
(PB0,1, P
B
1,0) that can make KLD = 0, and thereby blind the FC, if and only if {Bk}Kk=1 satisfy
K∑
k=1
(
Bk
Nk
K∑
i=k
Ni
)
≥
N
2
. (13)
Dividing both sides of (13) by N , the above condition can be written as ∑Kk=1 βk∑ki=1 αi ≥
0.5. This implies that to make the FC blind, 50% or more nodes in the network need to
be covered3 by the Byzantines. Next, to explore the optimal attacking probability distribution
(PB0,1, P
B
1,0) that minimizes KLD when (12) does not hold, we explore the properties of KLD.
First, we show that attacking with symmetric flipping probabilities is the optimal strategy in
the region where the attacker cannot blind the FC. In other words, attacking with P1,0 = P0,1 is
the optimal strategy for the Byzantines. For analytical tractability, we assume PHd = PBd = Pd
and PHfa = PBfa = Pfa in further analysis.
Lemma 1. In the region where the attacker cannot blind the FC, the optimal attacking strategy
comprises of symmetric flipping probabilities. More specifically, any non zero deviation ǫi ∈ (0, p]
in flipping probabilities (PB0,1, PB1,0) = (p− ǫ1, p − ǫ2), where ǫ1 6= ǫ2, will result in increase in
the KLD.
Proof: Let us denote, P (z = 1|H1) = π1,1, P (z = 1|H0) = π1,0 and t =
∑K
k=1 βk
∑k
i=1 αi.
Notice that, in the region where the attacker cannot blind the FC, the parameter t < 0.5. To
prove the lemma, we first show that any positive deviation ǫ ∈ (0, p] in flipping probabilities
(PB1,0, P
B
0,1) = (p, p − ǫ) will result in an increase in the KLD. After plugging in (PB1,0, PB0,1) =
(p, p− ǫ) in (7) and (8), we get
π1,1 = t(p− Pd(2p− ǫ)) + Pd (14)
π1,0 = t(p− Pfa(2p− ǫ)) + Pfa. (15)
Now we show that the KLD, D, as give in (6) is a monotonically increasing function of the
3Node i at level k′ covers all its children at levels k′ + 1 ≤ k ≤ K and the node i itself and, therefore, the total number of
covered nodes by Bk′ , Byzantine at level k′, is
Bk′
Nk′
.
∑K
i=k′ Ni.
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parameter ǫ or in other words, dD
dǫ
> 0.
dD
dǫ
= π1,1
(
π′1,1
π1,1
−
π′1,0
π1,0
)
+ π′1,1 log
π1,1
π1,0
+ (1− π1,1)
(
π′1,0
1− π1,0
−
π′1,1
1− π1,1
)
− π′1,1 log
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
(16)
where dπ1,1
dǫ
= π′1,1 = tPd and
dπ1,0
dǫ
= π′1,0 = tPfa and t is the fraction of covered nodes by the
Byzantines. After rearranging the terms in the above equation, the condition dD
dǫ
> 0 becomes
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
+
Pd
Pfa
log
π1,1
π1,0
>
π1,1
π1,0
+
Pd
Pfa
log
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
. (17)
Since Pd > Pfa and t < 0.5, π1,1 > π1,0. It can also be proved that
Pfa
Pd
π1,1
π1,0
< 1. Hence, we
have
1 + (π1,1 − π1,0) >
Pfa
Pd
π1,1
π1,0
which is equivalent to
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
+
Pd
Pfa
(
1−
π1,0
π1,1
)
>
π1,1
π1,0
+
Pd
Pfa
(
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
− 1
)
. (18)
Applying the logarithm inequality (x − 1) ≥ log x ≥ x− 1
x
, for x > 0 to (18), one can prove
that condition (17) is true.
Similarly, we can show that any non zero deviation ǫ ∈ (0, p] in flipping probabilities
(PB1,0, P
B
0,1) = (p− ǫ, p) will result in an increase in the KLD, i.e.,
dD
dǫ
> 0, or
π1,1
π1,0
+
1− Pd
1− Pfa
log
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
>
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
+
1− Pd
1− Pfa
log
π1,1
π1,0
. (19)
Since Pd > Pfa and t < 0.5, π1,1 > π1,0. It can also be proved that
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
>
1− Pd
1− Pfa
. Hence,
we have
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
>
1− Pd
1− Pfa
[1− (π1,1 − π1,0)] (20)
⇔
1
π1,1 − π1,0
[
π1,1
π1,0
−
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
]
>
1− Pd
1− Pfa
[
1
π1,0
+
1
1− π1,1
]
(21)
⇔
π1,1
π1,0
−
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
>
1− Pd
1− Pfa
[
π1,1 − π1,0
π1,0
+
π1,1 − π1,0
1− π1,1
]
(22)
⇔
π1,1
π1,0
+
1− Pd
1− Pfa
[
1−
1− π1,0
1− π1,1
]
>
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
+
1− Pd
1− Pfa
[
π1,1
π1,0
− 1
]
. (23)
DRAFT
11
Applying the logarithm inequality (x − 1) ≥ log x ≥ x− 1
x
, for x > 0 to (23), one can prove
that condition (19) is true. Condition (17) and (19) imply that any non zero deviation ǫi ∈ (0, p]
in flipping probabilities (PB0,1, PB1,0) = (p− ǫ1, p− ǫ2) will result in an increase in the KLD.
In the next theorem, we present a closed form expression for the optimal attacking probability
distribution (PBj,1, PBj,0) that minimizes KLD in the region where the attacker cannot blind the
FC.
Theorem 2. In the region where the attacker cannot blind the FC, the optimal attacking strategy
is given by (PB0,1, PB1,0) = (1, 1).
Proof: Observe that, in the region where the attacker cannot blind the FC, the optimal
strategy comprises of symmetric flipping probabilities (PB0,1 = PB1,0 = p). The proof is complete
if we show that KLD, D, is a monotonically decreasing function of the flipping probability p.
Let us denote, P (z = 1|H1) = π1,1 and P (z = 1|H0) = π1,0. After plugging in (PB0,1, PB1,0) =
(p, p) in (7) and (8), we get
π1,1 = t(p− Pd(2p)) + Pd (24)
π1,0 = t(p− Pfa(2p)) + Pfa. (25)
Now we show that the KLD, D, as given in (6) is a monotonically decreasing function of the
parameter p or in other words, dD
dp
< 0. After plugging in π′1,1 = t(1−2Pd) and π′1,0 = t(1−2Pfa)
in the expression of dD
dp
and rearranging the terms, the condition dD
dp
< 0 becomes
(1− 2Pfa)
(
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
−
π1,1
π1,0
)
+ (1− 2Pd) log
(
1− π1,0
1− π1,1
π1,1
π1,0
)
< 0 (26)
Since Pd > Pfa and t < 0.5, we have π1,1 > π1,0. Now, using the fact that
1− Pd
1− Pfa
>
1− 2Pd
1− 2Pfa
and (21), we have
1
π1,1 − π1,0
[
π1,1
π1,0
−
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
]
>
1− 2Pd
1− 2Pfa
[
1
π1,0
+
1
1− π1,1
]
(27)
⇔
π1,1
π1,0
+
1− 2Pd
1− 2Pfa
[
1−
1− π1,0
1− π1,1
]
>
1− π1,1
1− π1,0
+
1− 2Pd
1− 2Pfa
[
π1,1
π1,0
− 1
]
. (28)
Applying the logarithm inequality (x − 1) ≥ log x ≥ x− 1
x
, for x > 0 to (28), one can prove
that (26) is true.
DRAFT
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Fig. 2. KL distance vs Flipping Probabilities when Pd = 0.8, Pfa = 0.2, and the fraction of covered nodes by the Byzantines
is t = 0.4
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 2 that
corroborate our theoretical results. We plot KLD as a function of the flipping probabilities
(PB1,0, P
B
0,1). We assume that the probability of detection is Pd = 0.8, the probability of false
alarm is Pfa = 0.2 and the fraction of covered nodes by the Byzantines is t = 0.4. It can be
seen that the optimal attacking strategy comprises of symmetric flipping probabilities and is
given by (PB0,1, PB1,0) = (1, 1), which corroborate our theoretical result presented in Lemma 1
and Theorem 2.
Next, we explore some properties of the KLD with respect to the fraction of covered nodes
t in the region where the attacker cannot blind the FC, i.e., t < 0.5.
Lemma 2. D∗ = min
(PBj,1,P
B
j,0)
D(πj,1||πj,0) is a continuous, decreasing and convex function of fraction
of covered nodes by the Byzantines t = ∑Kk=1[βk(∑ki=1 αi)] in the region where the attacker
cannot blind the FC (t < 0.5).
Proof: The continuity of D(πj,1||πj,0) with respect to the involved distributions implies
the continuity of D∗. To show that D∗ is a decreasing function of t, we use the fact that
argmin
(PB0,1,P
B
1,0)
D(πj,1||πj,0) is equal to (1, 1) for t < 0.5 (as shown in Theorem 2). After plugging
(PB0,1, P
B
1,0) = (1, 1) in the KLD expression, it can be shown that the expression for the derivative
of D with respect to t, dD
dt
, is the same as (26). Using the results of Theorem 2, it follows
DRAFT
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KL distance vs Fraction of nodes covered when Pd = 0.8 and Pfa = 0.2
that dD
dt
< 0 and, therefore, D∗ is a monotonically decreasing function of t in the region where
t < 0.5. The convexity of D∗ follows from the fact that D∗(πj,1||πj,0) is convex in πj,1 and πj,0,
which are affine transformations of t (Note that, convexity holds under affine transformation).
It is worth noting that Lemma 2 suggests that by minimizing/maximizing the fraction of covered
nodes t, the FC can maximize/minimize the KLD. Using this fact, from now onwards we will
consider fraction of covered nodes t in lieu of the KLD in further analysis in the paper.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 3 that
corroborate our theoretical results. We plot min
(PBj,1,P
B
j,0)
KLD as a function of the fraction of covered
nodes. We assume that the probabilities of detection and false alarm are Pd = 0.8 and Pfa = 0.2,
respectively. Notice that, when 50% of the nodes in the network are covered, KLD between the
two probability distributions becomes zero and FC becomes blind. It can be seen that D∗ is
a continuous, decreasing and convex function of the fraction of covered nodes t in the region
t < 0.5, which corroborate our theoretical result presented in Lemma 2.
Until now, we have explored the problem from the attacker’s perspective. In the rest of the
paper we look into the problem from a network designer’s perspective and propose a technique
to mitigate the effect of the Byzantines. More specifically, we explore the problem of designing
a robust tree topology considering the Byzantine to incur a cost for attacking the network and
the FC to incur a cost for deploying (including the cost of protection, etc.) the network. The FC
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(network designer) tries to design a perfect a-ary tree topology under its cost budget constraint
such that the system performance metric, i.e., KLD is maximized. Byzantines, on the other
hand, are interested in attacking or capturing nodes to cause maximal possible degradation in
system performance, with the cost of attacking or capturing nodes not to exceed the attacker’s
budget. This problem can be formulated as a bi-level programming problem where the upper and
the lower level problems with conflicting objectives belong to the leader (FC) and the follower
(Byzantines), respectively.
IV. ROBUST TOPOLOGY DESIGN
In this problem setting, it is assumed that there is a cost associated with attacking each node
in the tree (which may represent resources required for capturing a node or cloning a node in
some cases). We also assume that the costs for attacking nodes at different levels are different.
Specifically, let ck be the cost of attacking any one node at level k. Also, we assume ck > ck+1
for k = 1, · · · , K − 1, i.e., it is more costly to attack nodes that are closer to the FC. Observe
that, a node i at level k covers (in other words, can alter the decisions of) all its successors and
node i itself. It is assumed that the network designer or the FC has a cost budget Cnetworkbudget and
the attacker has a cost budget Cattackerbudget . Let Pk denote the number of nodes covered by a node
at level k. We refer to Pk as the “profit” of a node at level k. Notice that, Pk =
∑K
i=k+1 Ni
Nk
+ 1.
Notice that, in a tree topology, Pk can be written as
Pk = ak × Pk+1 + 1 for k = 1, ..., K − 1, (29)
where Pk is the profit of attacking a node at level k, Pk+1 is the profit of attacking a node
at level k + 1 and ak is the number of immediate children of a node at level k. For a perfect
a-ary tree ak = a, ∀k and Pk = a
K−k+1−1
a−1
. The FC designs the network, such that, given the
attacker’s budget, the fraction of covered nodes is minimized, and consequently a more robust
perfect a-ary tree in terms of KLD (See Lemma 2) is generated. Next, we formulate our robust
topology design problem.
A. Robust Perfect a-ary Tree Topology Design
Since the attacker aims to maximize the fraction of covered nodes by attacking/capturing
{Bk}Kk=1 nodes within the cost budget Cattackerbudget , the FC’s objective is to minimize the fraction
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of covered nodes by choosing the parameters (K, a) optimally in a perfect a-ary tree topol-
ogy T (K, a) under its cost budget Cnetworkbudget . This situation can be interpreted as a Bi-level
optimization problem, where the first decision maker (the so-called leader) has the first choice,
and the second one (the so-called follower) reacts optimally to the leader’s selection. It is the
leader’s aim to find such a decision which, together with the optimal response of the follower,
optimizes the objective function of the leader. For our problem, the upper level problem (ULP)
corresponds to the FC who is the leader of the game, while the lower level problem (LLP)
belongs to the attacker who is the follower. We assume that the FC has complete information
about the attacker’s problem, i.e., the objective function and the constraints of the LLP. Similarly,
the attacker is assumed to be aware about the FC’s resources, i.e., cost of deploying the nodes
{ck}Kk=1. Next, we formalize our robust perfect a-ary tree topology problem as follows:
minimize
(K, a)∈Z+
∑K
k=1(a
K−k+1 − 1)Bk
a(aK − 1)
subject to amin ≤ a ≤ amax
K ≥ Kmin
K∑
k=1
ak ≥ Nmin
K∑
k=1
cka
k ≤ Cnetworkbudget
maximize
Bk∈Z+
∑K
k=1(a
K−k+1 − 1)Bk
a(aK − 1)
subject to
K∑
k=1
ckBk ≤ C
attacker
budget
Bk ≤ a
k, ∀ k = 1, 2, . . . , K
(30)
where Z+ is the set of non-negative integers, amin ≥ 2 and Kmin ≥ 2. The objective function
in ULP is the fraction of covered nodes by the Byzantines
∑K
k=1 PkBk∑K
k=1 Nk
, where Pk = a
K−k+1−1
a−1
and
∑K
k=1Nk =
a(aK−1)
a−1
. In the constraint amin ≤ a ≤ amax, amax represents the hardware
constraint imposed by the Medium Access Control (MAC) scheme used and amin represents the
design constraint enforced by the FC. The constraint on the number of nodes in the network∑K
k=1 a
k ≥ Nmin ensures that the network satisfies pre-specified detection performance guar-
DRAFT
16
antees. In other words, Nmin is the minimum number of nodes needed to guarantee a certain
detection performance. The constraint on the cost expenditure
∑K
k=1 cka
k ≤ Cnetworkbudget ensures
that the total expenditure of the network designer does not exceed the available budget.
In the LLP, the objective function is the same as that of the FC, but the sense of optimization
is opposite, i.e., maximization of the fraction of covered nodes. The constraint
∑K
k=1 ckBk ≤
Cattackerbudget ensures that the total expenditure of the attacker does not exceed the available budget.
The constraints Bk ≤ ak, ∀k are logical conditions, which prevent the attacker from attacking
non-existing resources.
Notice that, the bi-level optimization problem, in general, is an NP-hard problem [22]. In
fact, the optimization problem corresponding to LLP is the packing formulation of the Bounded
Knapsack Problem (BKP) [23], which itself, in general, is NP-hard. Next, we discuss some
properties of our objective function that enable our robust topology design problem to have a
polynomial time solution.
Lemma 3. In a perfect a-ary tree topology, the fraction of covered nodes
∑K
k=1 PkBk∑K
k=1 Nk
by the
attacker with the cost budget Cattackerbudget for an optimal attack is a non-decreasing function of the
number of levels K in the tree.
Proof: Let us denote the optimal attacking set for a K level perfect a-ary tree topology
T (K, a) by {B1k}Kk=1 and the optimal attacking set for a perfect a-ary tree topology with K +1
levels by {B2k}K+1k=1 given the cost budget Cattackerbudget . To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show
that
∑K+1
k=1 P
2
kB
2
k∑K+1
k=1 Nk
≥
∑K
k=1 P
2
kB
1
k∑K+1
k=1 Nk
≥
∑K
k=1 P
1
kB
1
k∑K
k=1Nk
, (31)
where P 1k is the profit of attacking a node at level k in a K level perfect a-ary tree topology
and P 2k is the profit of attacking a node at level k in a K + 1 level perfect a-ary tree topology.
First inequality in (31) follows due to the fact that {B1k}Kk=1 may not be the optimal attacking
set for topology T (K + 1, a). To prove the second inequality observe that, an increase in the
value of parameter K results in an increase in both the denominator (number of nodes in the
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network) and the numerator (fraction of covered nodes). Using this fact, let us denote∑K
k=1 P
2
kB
1
k∑K+1
k=1 Nk
=
x+ x1
y + y1
(32)
with x =
∑K
k=1 P
1
kB
1
k with P 1k =
aK−k+1 − 1
a− 1
, y =
∑K
k=1Nk =
a(aK − 1)
a− 1
, x1 =
∑K
k=1(B
1
ka
K−k+1)
is the increase in the profit by adding one more level to the topology and y1 = aK+1 is the
increase in the number of nodes in the network by adding one more level to the topology .
Note that x+ x1
y + y1
>
x
y
if and only if
x
y
<
x1
y1
, (33)
where x, y, x1, and y1 are positive values. Hence, it is sufficient to prove that
aK+1
∑K
k=1
(
B1
k
ak
)
−
∑K
k=1B
1
k
a(aK − 1)
≤
∑K
k=1(B
1
ka
K−k+1)
aK+1
.
The above equation can be further simplified to
K∑
k=1
(
B1k
ak
)
≤
K∑
k=1
(
B1k
a
)
which is true for all K ≥ 1.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 4 that
corroborate our theoretical results. We plot the fraction of covered nodes by the Byzantines as
a function of the total number of levels in the tree. We assume that a = 2 and vary K from 2
to 9. We also assume that the cost to attack nodes at different levels are given by [c1, · · · , c9] =
[52, 48, 24, 16, 12, 8, 10, 6, 4] and the cost budget of the attacker is Cattackerbudget = 50. For each
T (K, 2), we find the optimal attacking set {Bk}Kk=1 by an exhaustive search. It can be seen that
the fraction of covered nodes is a non-decreasing function of the number of levels K, which
corroborate our theoretical result presented in Lemma 3.
Next, we explore some properties of the fraction of covered nodes with parameter a for a
perfect a-ary tree topology. Before discussing our result, we define the parameter amin as follows.
For a fixed K and attacker’s cost budget Cattackerbudget , amin is defined as the minimum value of a
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Fig. 4. Fraction of nodes covered vs Parameter K when a = 2, K is varied from 2 to 9, [c1, · · · , c9] =
[52, 48, 24, 16, 12, 8, 10, 6, 4], and Cattackerbudget = 50
for which the attacker cannot blind the network or cover 50% or more nodes. So we can restrict
our analysis to amin ≤ a ≤ amax. Notice that, the attacker cannot blind all the trees T (K, a) for
which a ≥ amin and can blind all the trees T (K, a) for which a < amin.
Lemma 4. In a perfect a-ary tree topology, the fraction of covered nodes
∑K
k=1 PkBk∑K
k=1 Nk
by an
attacker with cost budget Cattackerbudget in an optimal attack is a decreasing function of parameter a
for a perfect a-ary tree topology for a ≥ amin ≥ 2.
Proof: As before, let us denote the optimal attacking set for a K level perfect a-ary tree
topology T (K, a) by {B1k}Kk=1 and the optimal attacking set for a perfect (a+1)-ary tree topology
T (K, a+ 1) by {B2k}Kk=1 given the cost budget Cattackerbudget . To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to
show that
∑K
k=1 P
2
kB
2
k∑K
k=1N
2
k
<
∑K
k=1 P
1
kB
2
k∑K
k=1N
1
k
≤
∑K
k=1 P
1
kB
1
k∑K
k=1N
1
k
, (34)
where N1k is the number of nodes at level k in T (K, a), N2k is the number of nodes at level k
in T (K, a + 1), P 1k is the profit of attacking a node at level k in T (K, a) and P 2k is the profit
of attacking a node at level k in T (K, a + 1). Observe that, an interpretation of (34) is that
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the attacker is using the attacking set {B2k}Kk=1 to attack T (K, a). However, one might suspect
that the set {B2k}k=Kk=1 is not a valid solution. More specifically, the set {B2k}k=Kk=1 is not a valid
solution in the following two cases:
1. min(B2k , N1k ) = N1k for any k: For example, if N11 = 4 for T (K, 4) and B21 = 5 for T (K, 5)
then it will not be possible for the attacker to attack 5 nodes at level 1 in T (K, 4) because the
total number of nodes at level 1 is 4. In this case, {B2k}Kk=1 might not be a valid attacking set
for the tree T (K, a).
2. {B2k}k=Kk=1 is an overlapping set4 for T (K, a): For example, for T (2, 3) if B21 = 2 and B22 = 4,
then, B21 and B22 are overlapping. In this case, {B2k}Kk=1 might not be a valid attacking set for
the tree T (K, a).
However, both of the above conditions imply that the attacker can blind the network with Cattackerbudget
(See Appendix A), which cannot be true for a ≥ amin, and, therefore, {B2k}Kk=1 will indeed be
a valid solution. Therefore, (34) is sufficient to prove the lemma.
Notice that, the second inequality in (34) follows due to the fact that {B2k}Kk=1 may not be the
optimal attacking set for topology T (K, a). To prove the first inequality in (34), we first consider
the case where attacking set {B2k}k=Kk=1 contains only one node, i.e., B2k = 1 for some k, and show
that P
2
k∑K
k=1 N
2
k
<
P 1
k∑K
k=1 N
1
k
. Substituting P 1k =
aK−k+1 − 1
a− 1
for some k and
∑K
k=1N
1
k =
a(aK − 1)
a− 1
in the left side inequality of (34), we have
(a)K−k+1 − 1
(a)((a)K − 1)
>
(a + 1)K−k+1 − 1
(a+ 1)((a+ 1)K − 1)
.
After some simplification, the above condition becomes
(a+ 1)K+1[(a)K−k+1 − 1]− (a)K+1[(a+ 1)K−k+1 − 1]
+(a)[(a+ 1)K−k+1 − 1]− (a + 1)[(a)K−k+1 − 1] > 0. (35)
In Appendix B, we show that
(a)[(a + 1)K−k+1 − 1]− (a+ 1)[(a)K−k+1 − 1] > 0 (36)
and
(a + 1)K+1[(a)K−k+1 − 1]− (a)K+1[(a + 1)K−k+1 − 1] ≥ 0. (37)
4We call Bk and Bk+x are overlapping, if the summation of Bk+xk and Bk+x is greater than Nk+x, where B
k+x
k is the
number of nodes covered by the attacking set Bk at level k + x. In a non-overlapping case, the attacker can always arrange
nodes {Bk}Kk=1 such that each path in the network has at most one Byzantine.
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Fig. 5. Fraction of nodes covered vs Parameter a when K = 6, parameter a is varied from 3 to 11, [c1, · · · , c9] =
[52, 48, 24, 16, 12, 8, 10, 6, 4], and Cattackerbudget = 50
From (37) and (36), condition (35) holds.
Since we have proved that
P 2k∑K
k=1N
2
k
<
P 1k∑K
k=1N
1
k
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
to generalize the proof for any arbitrary attacking set {B2k}Kk=1 we multiply both sides of the
above inequality with B2k and sum it over all 1 ≤ k ≤ K inequalities. Now, we have∑K
k=1 P
2
kB
2
k∑K
k=1N
2
k
<
∑K
k=1 P
1
kB
2
k∑K
k=1N
1
k
.
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 5 that
corroborate our theoretical results. We plot the fraction of covered nodes by the Byzantines
as a function of the parameter a in the tree. We assume that the parameter K = 6 and vary
a from 3 to 11. We also assume that the cost to attack nodes at different levels are given
by [c1, · · · , c9] = [52, 48, 24, 16, 12, 8, 10, 6, 4] and the cost budget of the attacker is
Cattackerbudget = 50. For each T (6, a) we find the optimal attacking set {Bk}Kk=1 by an exhaustive
search. It can be seen that the fraction of covered nodes is a decreasing function of the parameter
a, which corroborate our theoretical result presented in Lemma 4.
Next, based on the above Lemmas we present an algorithm which can solve our robust perfect
a-ary tree topology design problem (bi-level programming problem) efficiently.
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B. Algorithm for solving Robust Perfect a-ary Tree Topology Design Problem
Algorithm 1 Robust Perfect a-ary Tree Topology Design
Require: ck > ck+1 for k = 1, ...,K − 1
1: K ← Kmin; a← amax
2: if
(∑K
k=1 cka
k > Cnetworkbudget
)
then
3: Find the largest integer a− ℓ, ℓ ≥ 0, such that
∑K
k=1 ck(a− ℓ)
k ≤ Cnetworkbudget
4: if (a− ℓ < amin) then
5: return (φ, φ)
6: else
7: a← a− ℓ
8: end if
9: end if
10: if
(∑K
k=1 a
k ≥ Nmin
)
then
11: return (K, a)
12: else
13: K ← K + 1
14: return to Step 2
15: end if
Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we present a polynomial time algorithm for solving the
robust perfect a-ary tree topology design problem. Observe that, the robust network design
problem is equivalent to designing perfect a-ary tree topology with minimum K and maximum
a that satisfy network designer’s constraints. In Algorithm 1, we start from the solution candidate
(amax, Kmin). If it does not satisfy the cost expenditure constraint we reduce amax by one, i.e.,
amax ← amax−1. Next, the algorithm checks for the total number of nodes constraint and if it is
not satisfied, we increase Kmin by one, i.e., Kmin ← Kmin +1. After these steps, the algorithm
checks whether this new solution candidate satisfies both the constraints. If it does, this will be
the solution for the problem, otherwise, the algorithm solves the problem recursively until the
hardware constraint is violated, i.e., a < amin. In this case (a < amin), we will not have any
feasible solution which satisfies the network designer’s constraints.
This procedure greatly reduces the complexity because we do not need to solve the lower
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level problem in this case. Next, we prove that Algorithm 1 indeed yields an optimal solution.
Lemma 5. Robust Perfect a-ary Tree Topology Design algorithm (Algorithm 1) yields an optimal
solution (K∗, a∗), if one exists.
Proof: Assume that the optimal solution exists. Let us denote by (K∗, a∗), the optimal
solution given by Algorithm 1. The main idea behind our proof is that any solution (K, a) with
K ≥ K∗ and a ≤ a∗ cannot perform better than (K∗, a∗) as suggested by Lemma 3 and Lemma
4. By transitive property, it can be proved that any solution (K, a) with K ≥ K∗ and a ≤ a∗
cannot perform better than (K∗, a∗). Also, observe that, the only feasible solution in the region
(Kmin ≤ K ≤ K∗, a∗ ≤ a ≤ amax) is (K∗, a∗). This implies that (K∗, a∗) is an optimal
solution.
Notice that, our algorithm searches for the feasible solution with the smallest K and the largest
a. Any feasible solution (K, a) satisfies the following two conditions:
1) ∑Kk=1 ckak ≤ Cnetworkbudget ;
2) ∑Kk=1 ak ≥ Nmin.
By Lemma 4, if (K, a) is a feasible solution, then (K, a′) with a′ < a will not be a better
solution than (K, a). Hence, for a given K, Step 3 only locates the solution with largest a for a
given K. Furthermore, if both (K, a) and (K ′, a′) satisfy Condition 1 and K < K ′, then a ≥ a′.
Hence, for a given K, the largest a in the current iteration satisfying Condition 1 cannot be
larger than the a found in the previous iteration. This verifies that ℓ ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition
to find the largest a in Step 3.
Next, we prove that Algorithm 1 can stop when the first feasible solution has been found. Let
(K1, a1) be the first feasible solution found by Algorithm 1. It is clear that the next feasible
solution (K, a) must have K > K1 and a ≤ a1, since, the algorithm increases K and it satisfies
Condition 1. Algorithm 1 stops when both Condition 1 and Condition 2 satisfy.
By the previous argument given in the beginning of the proof, we conclude that (K, a) does
not perform better than (K1, a1). Hence, (K1, a1) is the optimal solution (K∗, a∗). It can be
seen that if there is no solution, then the algorithm will return (∅, ∅). This is due to the fact that
if a− ℓ < amin, then no a can satisfy Condition 1 for current and further iterations. Hence, the
algorithm terminates and returns (∅, ∅).
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Figure 6
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Fig. 6. KLD vs Parameters ’K’ and ’a’ when (Pd, Pfa) = (0.8, 0.2), Cnetworkbudget = 400000, Cattackerbudget = 50 and Nmin = 1400
that corroborate our theoretical results. We plot the min
P1,0,P0,1
KLD for all the combinations of
parameter K and a in the tree. We vary the parameter K from 2 to 10 and a from 3 to 11.
We also assume that the costs to attack nodes at different levels are given by [c1, · · · , c10] =
[52, 50, 25, 24, 16, 10, 8, 6, 5, 4], and cost budgets of the network and the attacker are given
by Cnetworkbudget = 400000, Cattackerbudget = 50, respectively. The node budget constraint is assumed to be
Nmin = 1400. For each T (K, a), we find the optimal attacking set {Bk}Kk=1 by an exhaustive
search. All the feasible solutions are plotted in red and unfeasible solutions are plotted in blue.
Notice that, T (Kmin, amax) which is T (2, 11) is not a feasible solution and, therefore, if we
use Algorithm 1 it will try to find the feasible solution which has minimum possible deviation
from T (Kmin, amax). It can be seen that the optimal solution T (3, 11) has minimum possible
deviation from the T (Kmin, amax), which corroborate our algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered distributed detection in perfect a-ary tree topologies in
the presence of Byzantines, and characterized the power of attack analytically. We provided
closed-form expressions for minimum attacking power required by the Byzantines to blind the
FC. We obtained closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies that minimize
the detection error exponent at the FC. We also looked at the possible counter-measures from
the FC’s perspective to protect the network from these Byzantines. We formulated the robust
topology design problem as a bi-level program and provided an efficient algorithm to solve it.
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There are still many interesting questions that remain to be explored in the future work such
as an analysis of the problem for arbitrary topologies. Note that, some analytical methodologies
used in this paper are certainly exploitable for studying the attacks in different topologies. Other
questions such as the case where Byzantines collude in several groups (collaborate) to degrade
the detection performance can also be investigated.
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APPENDIX A
We want to show that the set {Bk}Kk=1 can blind the FC if any of following two cases is true.
1. min(Bk, Nk) = Nk for any k,
2. {Bk}k=Kk=1 is an overlapping set
In other words, set {Bk}Kk=1 covers 50% or more nodes. Let us denote by k˜, the k for which
min(Bk, Nk) = Nk (there can be multiple such k). Then {Bk}Kk=1 satisfies
∑K
k=1 PkBk∑K
k=1Nk
≥
Pk˜Bk˜∑K
k=1Nk
≥
Pk˜Nk˜∑K
k=1Nk
≥
PKNK∑K
k=1Nk
. (38)
Similarly, let us assume Bk′ and Bk˜ are overlapping with k˜ = k′ + x (there can be multiple
overlapping k). Then {Bk}Kk=1 satisfies
∑K
k=1 PkBk∑K
k=1Nk
≥
Pk˜Bk˜ + Pk′Bk′∑K
k=1Nk
≥
Pk˜Nk˜∑K
k=1Nk
≥
PKNK∑K
k=1Nk
. (39)
Observe that, to prove our claim it is sufficient to show that
PKNK∑K
k=1Nk
≥ 0.5⇔ PKNK ≥
N
2
. (40)
Using the fact that for a Perfect a-ary tree PK = 1, NK = aK and N = a(a
K−1)
a−1
the condition (40)
becomes
2× aK ≥
a(aK − 1)
a− 1
. (41)
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When a ≥ 2, we have
a× aK ≥ 2× aK
⇔ a+ aK+1 ≥ 2× aK
⇔ 2× aK+1 − 2× aK ≥ aK+1 − a
⇔ 2× aK ≥
a(aK − 1)
a− 1
.
Hence, (40) holds and this completes our proof.
APPENDIX B
We skip the proof of (36) and only focus on the proof of (37). To show
(a+ 1)K+1[(a)K−k+1 − 1]− (a)K+1[(a + 1)K−k+1 − 1] ≥ 0 for a ≥ 2
is equivalent to show
aK+1[(a− 1)K−k+1 − 1]− (a− 1)K+1[aK−k+1 − 1] ≥ 0 for a ≥ 3
which can be simplified to
(a(a− 1))K−k+1[ak − (a− 1)k] ≥ [aK+1 − (a− 1)K+1]. (42)
Using binomial expansion, (42) becomes
(a(a− 1))K−k+1[ak−1 + (a− 1)ak−2 + · · ·+ (a− 1)k−1] ≥
[aK + (a− 1)aK−1 + · · ·+ (a− 1)K−1a+ (a− 1)K ]
⇔ (a− 1)K−k+1[aK + (a− 1)aK−1 + · · ·+ (a− 1)k−1aK−k+1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k terms
≥
[aK + (a− 1)aK−1 + · · ·+ (a− 1)k−1aK−k+1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k terms
+
[(a− 1)kaK−k + · · ·+ (a− 1)K−1a+ (a− 1)K ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K-k+1 terms
⇔ ((a− 1)K−k+1 − 1)[aK + · · ·+ (a− 1)k−1aK−k+1] ≥
[(a− 1)kaK−k + · · ·+ (a− 1)K−1a+ (a− 1)K ]. (43)
Since a ≥ 3, we have ((a− 1)K−k+1 − 1) ≥ (K − k + 1) ≥ 1. Hence,
((a− 1)K−k+1 − 1)[aK + · · ·+ (a− 1)k−1aK−k+1] ≥
((a− 1)K−k+1 − 1)aK ≥ [(a− 1)kaK−k + · · ·+ (a− 1)K ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K-k+1 terms
(44)
and (43) holds.
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